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Abstract In the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of entry in the euro led
to an output boom and large current account deficits in Portugal. Since then,
the boom has turned into a slump. Current account deficits are still large, and
so are budget deficits. This paper reviews the facts, the likely adjustment in the
absence of major policy changes, and examines policy options.
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1 Introduction
The Portuguese economy is in serious trouble: Productivity growth is anemic.
Growth is very low. The budget deficit is large. The current account deficit is
very large.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the options available to Portuguese
policy makers at this point. To do so however, the paper first returns to the
past, then examines the likely adjustment process in the absence of major
policy changes, and finally turns to policy options.
Section 2 reviews the past. To understand the situation today, one must go
back at least to the second half of the 1990s. Triggered by the commitment
by Portugal to join the euro, a sharp drop in interest rates and expectations
of faster growth both led to a decrease in private saving and an increase in
investment. The result was high output growth, decreasing unemployment,
increasing wages, and fast increasing current account deficits.
The future however turned disappointing. Productivity growth went from
bad to worse. The investment boom came to an end, and, with disappointed
expectations, private saving increased. Fiscal deficits partly offset the increase
in private saving, but not by enough to avoid a slump. Overvaluation, the result
of earlier pressure on wages during the boom, implied that current account
deficits remained large.
This is where Portugal is today. In the absence of policy changes, the
most likely scenario is one of competitive disinflation, a period of sustained
high unemployment until competitiveness has been reestablished, the current
account deficit and unemployment are reduced. This process is analyzed in
Section 3. It is a process fraught with dangers, both economic and political,
and one which can easily derail. It makes it imperative to think about what
policy can do. The options are basically two:
The first and obviously most attractive one is to achieve a sustained increase
in productivity growth, and make sure it is not fully reflected in wage growth
until unemployment and the current account deficits are reduced. Given the
low level of income per capita in Portugal relative to the top EU countries,
getting closer to the frontier would seem achievable. Section 4 focuses on
which reforms and institutional changes are most likely to succeed.
The second is lower nominal wage growth. It is obviously less attractive than
higher productivity growth. But it can potentially work much faster, in effect
achieving the required increase in competitiveness without a long period of
unemployment. The main issue is that, in the current environment of already
low wage inflation both in Portugal and the rest of the EU, such a strategy, if
it is to work fast enough, would require a large decrease in the nominal wage.
Section 5 focuses on whether and how it can be achieved.
Portugal is not the only Euro country in trouble. Italy shares many of
the same problems. And Germany is now just emerging from a similar cycle
of boom, overvaluation, and slump. Section 6 looks briefly at the German
experience, with a focus on potential lessons for Portugal.
Section 7 concludes. In short, in the absence of policy changes, the adjust-
ment is likely to be long and painful. It can be made shorter, and less painful.
Higher productivity growth and low nominal wage growth are not mutually
exclusive, and the best policy is probably to combine both. Fiscal policy also
has an important role to play. Deficit reduction is required, but its pace and its
contents may be linked to reforms and wage moderation.













































Fig. 1 Unemployment rate and current account deficit
2 From boom to slump, and current account deficits
Figure 1 puts the current Portuguese economic situation in historical per-
spective. It shows the evolution of the unemployment rate and the current
account deficit (as a ratio of GDP) since 1995. Two periods clearly stand out:
From 1995 to 2001, a steady decrease in unemployment and a rapidly growing
current account deficit; since 2001, a steady increase in unemployment, and
a continuing current account deficit, with the forecasts being for more of the
same until at least 2007.1
Start with the boom. It is clear that its proximate cause was participation in
the ERM and in the construction of the euro.2 With the reduction of inflation,
the elimination of country risk, and access to the euro bond market, Portuguese
nominal interest rates declined from 16% in 1992 to 4% in 2001; over the same
period, real interest rates declined from 6 to roughly 0%. Combined with ex-
pectations that participation in the euro would lead to faster convergence and
thus faster growth for Portugal, the result was an increase in both consumption
and investment. Household saving dropped, investment increased. The actual
1Methodological changes in the Labor Force Survey imply a break in the unemployment series in
1998. It is estimated that, under the pre-1998 definition, the unemployment rate would be roughly
1% higher than it is today.
2For more details, see for example Constâncio (2005), Fagan and Gaspar (2005), or Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2002).
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budget deficit decreased a bit. But discretionary fiscal policy was expansionary:
From 1995 to 2001, the cyclically adjusted primary deficit—which adjusts for
the effects of lower interest rates and output growth—increased by roughly
4%.
The result was high output growth, and a steady decrease in unemployment.
(Basic numbers for 1995 to 2001, and for 2001 on, are given in Tables 1 and 2
respectively. I decided to use numbers from the OECD Economic Outlook
database rather than national numbers to facilitate comparisons with other
countries.) With low unemployment, nominal wage growth was substantially
higher than labor productivity growth, leading to growth in unit labor costs
higher than in the rest of the euro area (an area which accounts for roughly
70% of Portuguese trade). The result of high output growth and decreasing
competitiveness (I shall define competitiveness as the inverse of unit labor
costs relative to those in the euro area) was a steady increase in the current
account deficit, from close to 0% in 1995 to more than 10% in 2000.
Should the government have aimed to limit the size of the boom and the
size of the current account deficit through tighter fiscal policy? With hindsight,
the answer is surely yes. But, at the time, the answer was less obvious:
– First, initial unemployment was clearly above the natural rate. While an
unemployment rate of 7.3% in 1996 is not high by EU standards, it was a
historically high rate for Portugal. Thus, some growth in excess of normal
growth was justified. By the end of the 1990s however, unemployment
had clearly become lower than the natural rate, and excess growth was
no longer justified.
– Second, some current account deficit was also clearly justified. A lower
real rate of interest and expectations of faster convergence both justify
higher private spending, be it consumption and investment. And indeed,
Table 1 Macroeconomic evolutions, 1995–2001
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growth 4.3 3.6 4.2 4.7 3.9 3.8 2.0
(relative to euro) 1.9 2.1 1.5 1.9 1.1 0.0 0.1
Unemployment rate 7.2 7.3 6.7 5.0 4.4 4.0 4.0
Current account −0.1 −3.6 −5.5 −6.6 −8.1 −10.2 −9.0
Household saving 13.6 11.8 10.3 9.9 8.6 10.9 10.9
Budget surplus −5.3 −4.6 −3.4 −3.0 −2.8 −2.9 −4.3
Primary surplus (cycl adj) 1.9 1.3 0.8 −0.4 −0.7 −1.6 −2.4
Nominal wage growth 6.7 9.0 3.8 4.3 4.0 6.9 5.2
Productivity growth 5.8 3.6 2.4 2.6 3.1 1.8 0.2
Unit labor cost growth 1.0 5.4 1.3 1.8 0.9 5.1 5.0
(relative to euro) −0.7 4.8 1.8 1.4 0.2 4.0 2.7
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database June 2006. Current account: ratio of the current
account balance to GDP. Household saving: ratio to disposable income. Budget surplus and
cyclically adjusted primary surplus: ratios to GDP. Nominal wage growth and labor productivity
are for the business sector.
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Table 2 Actual and projected macroeconomic evolutions, 2001–2007
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
GDP growth 2.0 0.8 −1.1 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.5
(relative to euro) 0.1 −0.2 −1.8 −0.7 −1.1 −1.5 −0.6
Unemployment rate 4.0 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.7 7.9 7.7
Current account −9.0 −6.4 −5.2 −7.4 −9.3 −9.6 −9.7
Household saving 10.9 10.5 10.8 10.1 9.9 9.6 9.6
Budget surplus −4.3 −2.9 −3.0 −3.2 −6.0 −5.0 −4.5
Primary surplus (cycl adj) −2.4 −0.3 0.8 0.6 −1.6 0.1 0.5
Nominal wage growth 5.2 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.2
Productivity growth 0.2 0.1 −0.7 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.6
Unit labor cost growth 5.0 3.7 3.9 2.3 3.1 2.4 1.6
(relative to euro) 2.7 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.4 1.7 0.7
Source and definitions: same as Table 1. The year 2001 is repeated for convenience. The numbers
for 2006 and 2007 are OECD forecasts, as of June 2006.
the boom was primarily driven by private spending. This does not, by itself,
imply that the government should have just stood by (this would be true
only if there were no other imperfections in the economy). But it implies
that the large current account deficits could be seen as largely benign, the
manifestation of the advantages of tighter financial integration into the
euro.3
Whether or not, given expectations at the time, policy should have been
tighter is now an academic question—although an important and open aca-
demic question.4 Starting in the early 2000s, the future turned out to be
disappointing...
– Higher labor productivity growth did not materialize. Instead, it nearly
vanished, averaging 0.2% per year from 2001 to 2005. The investment
3This was indeed the interpretation Giavazzi and I gave in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). Our
discussant, Pierre Olivier Gourinchas (Gourinchas 2002), was more worried about the required
adjustment. He was right.
4Take a standard intertemporal open economy model, with tradables and non-tradables, and a
fixed exchange rate. Assume away all imperfections. Then, a decrease in the world interest rate,
or an increase in productivity growth will lead to an increase in consumption and investment,
and so to a current account deficit. If labor supply is inelastic, the wage, and with it the price of
non-tradables will increase. Later on, as the country pays interest on accumulated debt, the wage
will decrease, and with it, the price of non-tradables. There is no reason for the government to
intervene. (A formal model along these lines is presented by Fagan and Gaspar (2005)). Suppose
however that wages adjust slowly to labor market conditions. Then, the increase in demand will
lead not only to a current account deficit, but also to an increase in output above its natural level.
Suppose the government can use fiscal policy to affect demand (because of finite horizons by
private agents for example). Should it maintain output at the natural level, and in the process
eliminate the (partly desirable) current account deficit? Or should it allow for some increase in
output and some current account deficit? The question is of relevance not only for Portugal, but
for many other countries.
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boom came to an end. And, because of high accumulated debt and worse
future prospects, household saving increased.
– The increase in private saving was partly offset by increasing public
dissaving. The actual deficit steadily increased, reaching 6% in 2005. After
an improvement in the early 2000s, the cyclically adjusted primary deficit
again turned negative in 2005. The ratio of debt to GDP, using the
Maastricht definition, reached 68% at the end of 2006.
– Lower growth and thus lower import demand should have led to a decrease
in the current account deficit. But this was largely offset by a continuing
increase in relative labor costs. True, nominal wage growth decreased; but
whatever competitive advantage this would have given Portugal was more
than offset by the decline in productivity growth. As a result, relative unit
labor costs have increased by more than 10% since 2001. Because Portugal
is largely a price taker for its exports, export prices have not increased
very much, if at all; the implication is that profitability in non-tradables has
dramatically decreased.5
– The effects of overvaluation from the boom were compounded by com-
position effects in exports. A large proportion of Portuguese exports
is in “low tech” goods, roughly 60% compared to an average of 30%
for the euro area, goods where competition with emerging economies is
strongest.6 Also, remittances have steadily decreased, from 3% of GDP in
1996 (down from 10% in the 1980s...) to 1.5% today. This suggests that,
in the absence of the boom-induced overvaluation, the current account
balance would still have deteriorated.
Lower consumption and investment demand have led to an output slump.
Growth was negative in 2003, and has averaged 0.3% since 2001. The unem-
ployment rate has increased back to 7.9%. As a result of increases in relative
unit labor costs on top of adverse structural trends, the current account deficit
has steadily increased, reaching 9.6% in 2006. And it increasingly reflects a
large budget deficit, rather than low private saving or high investment.
5Another logical possibility is that wages have increased much less in the tradable sector than
for the economy as a whole. Computations from Quadros de Pessoal by Pedro Portugal suggest
however that this has not been the case, at least up to 2002 (the latest date for which the
information is available.) Bargained and actual wages have grown at the same rate in the textile
or clothing sectors for example as in the private sector as a whole.
6These numbers come from the ECB (2005). For more on export composition, see also Cabral
(2004). Some other computations suggest however a less dire picture. For example, computations
by Lionel Fontagne of the correlation of export shares with China’s export shares, using disaggre-
gated (HS6 level) sectoral data, suggest that this correlation is not higher for Portugal than it is for
Germany, reflecting the fact that competition with emerging economies in medium tech goods is
also relevant.
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3 What happens next?
What happens next, absent major policy changes and major surprises7, is a
period of “competitive disinflation”: a period of sustained high unemployment,
leading to lower nominal wage growth until relative unit labor costs have
decreased, competitiveness has improved, the current account deficit has
decreased, and demand and output have recovered.
The process is familiar from exchange rate-based stabilizations (see for
example Rebelo and Vegh 1995), and from the competitive disinflation many
countries went through in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s in order to join
the euro. The evidence is that it is typically a long and painful process.
In our study of the competitive disinflation process in France in the 1980s
and early 1990s Blanchard and Muet (1993) concluded that, starting from
equal inflation at home and abroad, a 20% gap in competitiveness, and an
unemployment rate initially 2% above the natural rate, it took 4 years to
reduce the competitiveness gap to 12% (and by then, the unemployment gap
was still 1.2%), 6 years to reduce it to 8% (with an unemployment gap still
equal to 0.8%).
Are there reasons to be more optimistic for Portugal, to think that, in the
absence of major policy changes, the unemployment cost needed to reestablish
competitiveness would be lower? The answer is probably not.
One can think of the effects of unemployment on wages and thus on
competitiveness as depending primarily on two elements (I shall keep the
argument in the text informal. A formal model is given in Box 1):
– The first is real wage rigidities, i.e. the effect of unemployment on the
rate of change of real wages. The weaker the effect of unemployment,
the slower the decrease in wages for a given unemployment gap, and thus
the more total unemployment is needed to achieve a given improvement
in competitiveness.
Is there any reason to believe that real wages are more flexible in Portugal
than they were in France in the 1980s and 1990s? I read the econometric
evidence as giving a negative answer. Based on the sharp adjustment in
real wages in the early 1980s, some researchers have concluded that wages
were quite flexible in Portugal. But the main cause of the adjustment
seems to have been the devaluations which took place at the time, rather
than a strong response of wages to labor market conditions (see Francisco
Dias et al. 2004). Coefficients estimated over the more recent past suggest
limited real wage flexibility.
As the econometric evidence is murky, it is useful to look at the wage
bargaining institutional setup directly. Such a look suggests that, as wages
are typically above those set in sectoral bargaining, there is substantial
room for firms to decrease wages, that there is what Portugal and Cardoso
call a substantial “wage cushion” (see Cardoso and Portugal 2005). It
7The usual warning here: Surprises will happen; only their sign is unknown.
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appears however that this wage cushion has been partly used by firms in
recent years; this suggests that flexibility is indeed smaller today than it
was in the early 2000s.
– The second is nominal wage rigidities. This expression is used however to
describe two very different aspects of wage setting.
The first is the presence of lags in the response of nominal wages to
prices—and of prices to nominal wages. The longer the lags, the slower
the adjustment of wages for a given unemployment gap, thus the more
unemployment is needed to achieve a given improvement in competi-
tiveness. Empirical evidence suggests that, even if each lag is small, their
joint presence can substantially increase the unemployment cost of the
adjustment.
The second is however as relevant or more relevant today. It comes from
the fact that workers may be reluctant to accept nominal wage declines. In-
deed, in Portugal today, the labor law forbids “unjustified wage decreases”
and in practice rules out decreases in nominal wages for economic reasons.
The evidence on wage changes shows indeed the presence of substantial
nominal rigidity of this type in Portugal (see for example the histograms
of wage changes by year in the Banco de Portugal (2004) Box 2–5, and
Dickens et al. (2005) for an international comparison).
In a world of low inflation, this second constraint, if present, sharply
limits the speed at which competitiveness can be improved. Suppose for
example that nominal wages are increasing at 2% in the euro area, and
that productivity growth in tradables is the same in Portugal and in the the
rest of the euro area. Then, the most which can be achieved, i.e. nominal
wage growth of 0%, only leads to an improvement of competitiveness of
2% a year.
To summarize, real rigidities limit the speed of adjustment of the wage to
labor market conditions. Nominal rigidities further slow and may even stop
the adjustment. The higher real or nominal rigidities, the larger the amount of
unemployment needed to reestablish competitiveness.
What can be done to alleviate the unemployment cost of adjustment?
– One way is to achieve higher productivity growth. Higher productivity
growth is clearly desirable on its own as it implies a higher rate of growth
of GDP per capita. And it will improve competitiveness so long as it is
not fully reflected in wage growth. This points to reforms in the goods and
financial markets.
– Even with dramatic reforms, productivity growth is unlikely however to
increase overnight. Thus, another and potentially much faster way to
reestablish competitiveness is to decrease nominal wage growth—indeed,
given the circumstances, to achieve a decrease in nominal wages—without
relying on unemployment to do the job over time.
Are there other ways? The answer is basically no.
Out-migration, the main mechanism through which individual U.S. states
return to low unemployment after an adverse shock, is not an option, at least
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on the scale in which it would have to take place to solve the problem in
Portugal.
Fiscal policy could in principle be used to increase aggregate demand and
reduce unemployment. This however would come at the cost of an even larger
current account deficit, and, by decreasing unemployment and the downward
pressure on wages, would slow down or even stop the improvement in com-
petitiveness. It would thus imply larger and longer lasting current account
deficits. Thus, even leaving aside the facts that the ratio of public debt to GDP
is already high and would be getting higher, this would only postpone the
macroeconomic adjustment, not solve it. I shall later argue that fiscal policy
can help as part of a policy package. The point made here is that, by itself, it
cannot solve both the competitiveness and the unemployment problems.
In this context, let me briefly take up a proposition that has appeared in
some policy discussions, the proposition that a fiscal consolidation could, in the
current context, be expansionary and perhaps even improve competitiveness.
While there are indeed circumstances in which a fiscal consolidation can
increase demand in the short run, I do not believe that this is the case for
Portugal today. The main channel through which fiscal consolidation can
increase demand in the short run is by allowing for a dramatic reduction in
real interest rates. This would not be the case for Portugal, as the nominal
interest rate is determined for the euro area as a whole, and there is, for the
time being, only a negligible risk premium on Portuguese bonds. Thus, while
deficit reduction is needed, it would be unwise to expect it to lead, by itself,
to higher demand and lower unemployment. For the same reason, it would be
unwise to expect deficit reduction to lead to a boom in investment, and through
capital accumulation, to a substantial improvement in competitiveness.
Box. Wage and price dynamics Consider a small country which is part of a
common currency area (the euro area), and which produces and consumes
tradables and non-tradables.
Assume the wage equation is given by:
w = Ep + Ea − β(u − u¯) where
p ≡ αpN + (1 − α)pT
a ≡ αaN + (1 − α)aT
where w is the log of the nominal wage, so w is the rate of change of the
nominal wages; p is the log of the consumption price deflator (itself a weighted
average of the price of non tradables and the price of tradables), so p is
the rate of inflation using the CPI deflator; a is log productivity growth (a
weighted average of productivity growth in non tradables and tradable pro-
duction); u and u¯ are the actual and natural unemployment rates respectively;
E denotes an expectation. (A more general, and theoretically more appealing,
formulation, would assume that wages follow an error correction mechanism,
in which case an error-correction term would appear on the right. Introducing
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such a term would complicate the presentation but not change substantially
the points made below.)
The equation therefore states that wage inflation depends on expected
price inflation, expected productivity growth, and the unemployment gap, the
deviation of the unemployment rate from the actual rate.
Assume that home and foreign tradables are perfect substitutes, so the
rate of change of tradables prices is equal to the rate of euro wage inflation
minus the rate of euro productivity growth (euro area variables are denoted
by asterisks):
pT = p∗T = w∗ − a∗T
Assume that the non-tradable sector produces under constant returns to labor,
so the price of non-tradables is given by:
pN = w − aN
Finally, define competitiveness as z ≡ pT − w + aT , the price minus unit
labor cost in tradables, or equivalently z = w∗ − a∗T − w + aT , the inverse of
relative unit labor costs. The question: How much unemployment is needed to
achieve a given improvement in competitiveness?
Assume first that expectations are equal to actual values. In this case, the
equations above yield:
z = β
1 − α (u − u¯) (1)
The change in competitiveness depends only on the unemployment gap. It is
independent of the evolution of productivity in tradables and non-tradables.
The coefficient β captures real wage rigidities. The lower that coefficient,
the larger the unemployment needed to achieve a given improvement in
competitiveness.
Now introduce nominal rigidities (of type 1), i.e. lags in the response
of wages to prices. Maintain for the moment the assumption that expected
productivity growth is equal to actual productivity growth, and assume both
to be constant over time. But assume now that expected inflation is equal to
lagged inflation:
Ep = p(−1)
In this case, the equations above yield:
z = αz(−1) − β(u − u¯)
Compare this equation with the equation obtained absent nominal rigidities.
The effect of a given unemployment gap on competitiveness is now slower.
This in turn implies that more unemployment is needed to achieve a given
improvement in competitiveness.
Finally consider the effects of changes in productivity growth. To the
extent that such changes are anticipated, Eq. 1 shows they have no effect
Adjustment within the euro. The difficult case of Portugal 11
on competitiveness. So we must look at the effects of unanticipated changes.
Define vN ≡ aN − EaN, vT ≡ aT − EaT and v = αvN + (1 − α)vT , so v
is unanticipated aggregate productivity growth.
Assume, for simplicity, that expected inflation is equal to actual inflation.
Then, the equations above imply:
z = β
1 − α (u − u¯) +
1
1 − α v
For a given unemployment gap, an unanticipated increase in productivity leads
to an increase in competitiveness. This in turn implies that less unemployment
is needed to achieve a given improvement in competitiveness.
An important implication is that it does not matter whether the unantic-
ipated increase in overall productivity growth comes from the tradables or
the non-tradables sector. What matters is v, not its composition. vT and vN
work however in very different ways. vT directly improves competitiveness,
but, for a given unemployment rate, has no further effect on the wage. vN
instead decreases the price of non tradables, which in turn decreases the wage,
therefore improving competitiveness in the tradables sector. This also indicates
when the equivalence breaks down. If wage inflation is already equal to zero
for example, and wage inflation cannot be negative (the second type of nominal
wage rigidity described in the text), productivity growth in the non-tradables
sector will not be fully reflected in wage inflation, and therefore will have no
effect on competitiveness.
4 Increasing productivity growth
GDP per capita (at PPP prices) in Portugal is $16,400. This is only 52% of GDP
per capita in the top five EU members ($31,500). Given Portugal’s membership
in both the EU and the euro, one might think that this 48% gap would be easy
to reduce, that Portugal could achieve substantially higher productivity growth
than it currently does.8
A McKinsey study of productivity in Portugal (2005) looks at the sources
of this gap. Of the 48% gap, it attributes 16% to “structural” (geographic
and other) factors, and the rest, 32% to “non-structural” factors which can
be corrected through appropriate policies. If Portugal were able to make up,
for example, half of the non-structural gap in 10 years, this would translate to
an increase in productivity growth of 2.5% a year.9
Such an increase in productivity growth would clearly increase the growth
rate of GDP per capita. It would decrease the current account deficit only
8The evidence is that convergence is typically faster within common currency areas. See for
example Frankel and Rose (2002). Whether the relation is entirely causal is a matter of debate.
9For comparison’s sake: The rate of productivity growth in Poland over the last 10 years has been
close to 4.8%. Poland’s PPP GDP per capita, about $10,000, is still however lower than Portugal’s.
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to the extent that it improved competitiveness in the tradables sector, to
the extent that wage growth was less than productivity growth in tradables.
This might require wage agreements limiting real wage growth, but these are
easier to achieve if productivity growth is high in the first place. Under these
conditions, anticipations of higher income, and higher profitability could lead
to an increase in consumption and investment demand and output, and thus
reduce unemployment faster than under the adjustment path described earlier.
In effect, this would look very much like the scenario many had in mind in the
1990s. Productivity growth decreased rather than increased however, and that
scenario did not play out. This time, if productivity growth actually increased,
it would.
Let me look at the scenario in more detail, and take up two issues.
– Would it be better for the increase in productivity growth to take place in
the tradable sector or in the non-tradable sector? The perhaps surprising
answer is that, to a first approximation, it does not matter.
The reason is the following (the underlying algebra is given in Box 1):
At a given wage and unemployment rate, higher productivity in tradables
indeed translates directly into higher competitiveness. If the price of trad-
ables is given by the world market however, this has no further effect on
the price level, and thus no further effect on the wage. Higher productivity
in non-tradables on the other hand leads to a lower price of non-tradables,
which leads (for a given real consumption wage) to a lower wage. Thus,
it improves competitiveness through the lower wage rather than directly
through higher productivity in tradables.
The argument also shows the limits of this equivalence result: If, for
example, nominal wage growth is already equal to zero and cannot be
negative, then, improvements in productivity in non-tradables have no
effect on the wage, and thus no effect on competitiveness.
Still, even with this caveat, this equivalence is an important result. Im-
proving productivity in the tradables sector, where large companies are
more likely to be involved, and competition likely to be stronger, may be
much harder than improving productivity in non-tradables. Put another
way, improving zoning regulations or redefining the licensing process
and the division of tasks between local and national authorities, may be
as important—and easier to achieve—than helping create new high-tech
exporting firms.
– Is it essential for Portugal to improve productivity in the high tech sector
and increase its share of high-tech exports? The answer is, I suspect, no.10
First, Portugal does not have an obvious comparative advantage in high-
tech: The levels of education and R&D spending are both low relative
10The focus on “high-tech” innovations may be misleading in any case: An interesting study by
Bhide (2006) of a hundred venture-capital-backed firms in the United States shows that, in most
cases, these firms were not involved in upstream R&D, but rather combining existing innovations.
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to other members of the EU. Labor market institutions, in particular the
high level of employment protection, imply low labor mobility, and thus a
limited ability to reallocate resources as the high-tech frontier moves on.
A more obvious comparative advantage, and one which is likely to remain
for a long time, is in tourism. Many Portuguese balk at the idea of
the Florida model, the scenario in which Europeans come to retire in
Portugal.11 The experience of Spain suggests that this can be a major
source of private transfers (as retirees transfer funds from their country
of origin).12 The “Florida model,” as opposed to traditional tourism, also
comes with derived demand for many products, for example sophisticated
health care. Facilitating such a development through infrastructure and
coordination seems more promising than starting a new high-tech sector
from scratch.
What can actually be done to improve productivity? In answer to this
question, one typically hears a long litany of reforms, from reform of the
education system, to improvement in the judicial system, to deregulation of
the goods market, to changes in labor market laws. How does one go beyond
these generalities?
One approach is to use econometrics to relate growth to a number of
measures of institutions for a broad cross section of countries, to see how
Portugal fares, and how improvements in the different measures would in-
crease Portuguese growth. This is the approach followed for example by
Tavares (2004), based on the measures of institutions developed by Shleifer
et al. (1998) and by others.
Another, complementary, approach is to focus on specific sectors, to mea-
sure the productivity gap with other countries, and to try to identify the
proximate and deeper sources of this gap. This is what the McKinsey Global
Institute (2003) study did. It focused on seven specific sectors. Let me present
its findings for two of them, residential construction, and tourism.13 I believe
they give a good sense of what reforms may be most useful.
– The study found that productivity in residential construction was only 38%
of the level in the benchmark country, in this case the United States.
The main proximate causes behind this 62% gap were the lack of stan-
dardization in design and construction—for example under-utilization of
prefabricated materials—which accounted for 22% (one third of the gap);
11Francesco Giavazzi has suggested calling it the “Tuscany model,” which is relevant as well and
sounds more attractive. The relevant point is that higher income retirees bring larger transfers.
12There are 180,000 foreigners over the age of 65 in Spain; it is safe to assume most of them
are retirees. If Portugal attracted the same number of retirees, and their pensions were equal on
average to income per capita in Portugal, this would represent private transfers of close to 2% of
Portuguese GDP.
13The other sectors in the study are food retail, retail banking, telecommunications, road freight,
and the automotive sector.
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poor project design—for example high levels of rework—which accounted
for another 15%; inefficient execution—for example under-utilization of
labor and machinery—which accounted for another 10%.
What were the deeper, institutional, causes? The study concluded that
it was, first and foremost, informality, allowing small inefficient firms to
survive, and preventing economies of scale from being exploited; zoning
and licensing rules, limiting the number of large scale developments (15%
in Portugal versus 70% in the Netherlands for example) and the associated
economies of scale were also important.
– The study found that productivity in tourism (hotels) was only 44% of the
level in the benchmark country, in this case France.
The main proximate causes behind this 56% gap were low occupation rates
(42 versus 59% for France), and a limited role of hotel chains (10–25 versus
34% for France).
The deeper, institutional, causes, the study concluded, were labor regula-
tion, making it difficult for hotels to adjust to seasonality and shift-based
working schedules, and zoning and licensing laws, limiting the scope for
large resort formats, and limiting the role of international chains.
These are only case studies. But they make a convincing argument that
reducing informality, improving zoning and licensing requirements, adapting
employment protection laws to allow seasonal industries to use labor more
efficiently, would go some way towards increasing productivity in both non-
tradables and tradables. Reforms along these lines, rather than a high-tech
plan, may yield larger results in terms of productivity growth and improved
competitiveness.
In this particular context, how essential are reforms in the labor market?
There are clear signs that the Portuguese labor market is dysfunctional: At a
given rate of unemployment, average duration of unemployment is very long,
even by Western European standards, and flows in and out of unemployment
are very low. The main cause appears to be the high degree of employment
protection. To the extent that productivity growth depends in large part
on reallocation, this suggests that reducing employment protection could be
one of the keys to higher productivity growth. The study Blanchard and
Portugal (2001) did of job and worker flows in Portugal suggests however
a more nuanced conclusion. We found that job flows, that is the degree of
reallocation of labor across establishments, was, surprisingly, similar to that
of the United States. Worker flows however, including movements in and out
of unemployment, were unusually low. One interpretation of these findings is
that employment protection may not impede job reallocation as much as one
might have guessed. It may however reduce the quality of matches between
firms and workers, and thus imply a loss of productivity, if not of productivity
growth. My (tentative) conclusion is that, while reform of employment protec-
tion is highly desirable on other grounds (such as a decrease in the average
duration of unemployment, and better matching), it may not be essential for
the issue at hand, namely higher productivity growth.
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5 Decreasing wages
Increasing productivity growth is not easy and will not happen overnight.14 The
other way to reestablish competitiveness is to decrease nominal wage growth,
or even, in the current context of already low Portuguese and European wage
inflation, to actually decrease nominal wages. The important point here is that,
given productivity, this decrease in wages is needed to improve competitive-
ness. The issue is whether it is achieved over time through unemployment or
if unemployment can be avoided, and the same decrease achieved through a
voluntary and coordinated reduction of wages by workers.
The traditional way to achieve such a reduction is through a devaluation. If
successful, a devaluation leads to an increase in the price of tradables, given the
nominal wage and the price of non tradables. Put another way, it decreases the
real consumption wage and the relative price of non-tradables, and increases
profitability in the tradables sector. If workers can be convinced to accept the
decrease in the consumption wage, and thus not to increase nominal wages in
response to the increase in the price of tradables, the devaluation is successful
and competitiveness is improved. This was for example the case in Italy in
1992, where a wage freeze, which had been agreed to with unions before the
devaluation of the lira, was maintained after the devaluation—a devaluation
in excess of 30%.
Given Portugal’s membership in the euro, devaluation is not an option how-
ever (and I believe getting unilaterally out of the euro would have disruption
costs which would far exceed any gain in competitiveness which might be
obtained in this way). The same result can be achieved however, at least on
paper, through a decrease in the nominal wage and the price of non-tradables,
while the price of tradables remains the same. This clearly achieves the same
decrease in the real consumption wage, and the same increase in the relative
price of tradables. The question is: Can it actually be implemented? Let me
take a number of issues and objections:
– Decreases in nominal wages run into both psychological and legal prob-
lems. (Indeed, as indicated above, such decreases would probably require a
modification of existing labor laws to be implemented). Could the required
change in relative prices be achieved through taxes rather than through
wages?
The answer is yes, but only to a limited extent. Consider a balanced budget
shift from payroll taxes to VAT. Exporting firms will benefit: They pay
less in payroll taxes, and are subject to the foreign, unchanged, VAT rate.
Firms selling to the domestic market will lose: They pay less in payroll
taxes, but pay on net more in VAT. Such a shift will therefore achieve
14In the second half of 2003, a large drop in inflation in Chile was partly attributed to reforms in
the distribution sector (Banco Central de Chile 2004) (through their effects on profit margins as
much as on productivity). If true, this would be a nice example of how structural reforms can have
rapid macroeconomic effects. The evidence is not overwhelming however that this was the main
factor behind the decrease in inflation.
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an increase in competitiveness, without a change in nominal wages. In
practice, the scope for such a measure to reestablish competitiveness is
limited. The VAT rate was recently increased in Portugal from 19 to 21%.
The increase required to improve competitiveness by, say 20% or so,
would require a shift in taxation and an increase in VAT rates much larger
than is realistic or feasible within the EU.
– Could a nominal wage freeze—which has been used in other countries on
occasion, and is psychologically easier for workers to accept—rather than
an actual decrease in nominal wages, be sufficient?
The answer is that, in the current environment of low euro wage inflation
and poor productivity growth in Portugal, it would not achieve much. Take
the OECD forecasts for 2006 (as of June 2006): Wage growth and labor
productivity growth in the business sector for the euro area are forecast
to be 2.0 and 1.1% respectively, implying an increase in unit labor costs
of 0.9%. Wage and productivity growth in the business sector in Portugal
are forecast to be 2.2 and 0.6% respectively, implying an increase in unit
labor costs of 1.6%, thus a further increase in labor costs vis-á-vis the euro
area of 0.7%. A nominal wage freeze would imply instead a decrease in
relative labor costs of 1.5%. At that rate, it would take very many years to
reestablish competitiveness in Portugal.
– Can workers be induced to accept a decrease in nominal wages? The
answer may well be no. Unions may disagree with the diagnosis, and thus
disagree with the need to reestablish competitiveness. They may hope for
faster productivity growth. Many years of high unemployment may be
needed to convince workers of the need for adjustment.
There are nevertheless three important points to make here. The first is,
for given productivity growth, the adjustment of wages has to come sooner
or later if competitiveness is to be improved; the question is whether
the unemployment costs can be reduced. The second is that part of the
unemployment cost comes from nominal rigidities, not real rigidities.
Coordinating wage adjustments and thus reducing the role of nominal
rigidities can decrease the unemployment cost of the adjustment. The
third is that any decrease in nominal wages implies a smaller decrease
in real (consumption) wages. Assume tradable prices remain unchanged,
that non-tradable prices are set by a markup on wage costs, and the share
of tradables is roughly 50%. Then a decrease in nominal wages of 20%
leads to a decrease in consumption wages of only 10%. The reason is that
the price of non-tradables decreases in proportion to wages. This is still a
substantial decrease in real wages, but only half of the nominal decrease.
– Even if workers accept the two arguments above, they may still worry
that things may not turn out as expected. There are at least two legitimate
worries:
The first is that firms in the non-tradable sector may increase their margins
rather than decrease their prices in line with labor costs, or simply that the
pass-through from wages to non-tradable prices may be slow, implying a
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larger decrease in real wages for some time than implied by the computa-
tion above.15
An apparent solution to this would be to coordinate the decrease in wages
and non-tradable prices simultaneously. But, just like price controls, this
is likely to create major distortions: The reason is that producers of non-
tradables use tradables as inputs in production, and do this in different
proportions. This means that non-tradable prices will and should decline in
different proportions. A potentially better solution is an ex-post contingent
adjustment of nominal wages for inflation, if inflation turns out to be higher
(or, in this case, deflation turns out to be smaller) than expected.
The second worry is that, even if competitiveness is improved, the decrease
in real wages may lead to a large decrease in consumption demand, and
thus to a decrease in output and to more unemployment, at least in the
short run. A potential solution here may be a commitment to use fiscal
policy to sustain demand if needed. While, as discussed earlier, a fiscal
expansion would on its own be both dangerous and counterproductive, it
can, as part of a package of wage and fiscal commitments, help deliver
improvements in competitiveness and unemployment.
– The nominal interest rate is set by the ECB in euros. To the extent that
nominal wage decreases lead to anticipated deflation for some time, they
will lead to large ex-ante real interest rates, which will affect demand and
output adversely.
This is an important difference with what happens when the adjustment is
made through a devaluation. In that case, the nominal interest rate, post-
devaluation, typically decreases—as the probability of another devaluation
has decreased. At the same time, inflation and expected inflation typically
increase, reflecting the higher price of imports. On both counts, the real in-
terest rate is likely to decrease, not increase. Here, because the adjustment
is made through a decrease in wages and non-tradable prices, the effect
goes the other way.
This raises the question of whether, on those grounds, it is better to have a
large nominal wage decrease at the start, or instead to achieve smaller rates
of wage decrease over a number of years. The answer is that this channel
strengthens the argument for a large early nominal wage decrease. Take
the extreme case where the nominal wage decrease were unanticipated,
and the price of non-tradables did adjust to wages without lags. In that
case, the deflation would be fully unanticipated, and there would be no
effect on ex-ante real rates. Neither of these two assumptions is likely to
be met, so that there will, in any case, be some anticipated deflation. But
the argument remains: The more front-loaded the adjustment, the larger
15In many countries, the shift to the Euro has been perceived by consumers, right or wrong, to
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the unanticipated portion of the deflation, the smaller the effect on real
interest rates.
6 Learning from other countries
Portugal is not the only country within the Euro to be facing external balance
problems.16
Italy has not gone through a boom/bust cycle, but has instead suffered from
a slow but steady deterioration of its competitiveness. Low productivity growth
since the mid-1990s, together with sustained nominal wage growth, has led to
a steady decrease in competitiveness: Unit labor costs have increased by 15%
since 1995 relative to the Euro area. One reason this decline in competitiveness
has not translated in a large current account deficit appears to be low internal
demand, and low growth import growth.
In contrast, the performance of the Spanish economy since the mid-1990s
is widely considered a great success. The unemployment rate has decreased
from close to 20% to under 10%, an achievement sometimes referred to as the
“Spanish miracle”. This steady decrease in unemployment has come however
with a steady increase in nominal wages over (a very low rate of) productivity
16What follows is much too cursory. The intent is simply to replace the experience of Portugal in
a larger context.
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growth.17 Since 1995, unit labor costs have increased by 21% relative to the
Euro area. Growth and appreciation have combined to create a large current
account deficit, now equal to 9% of GDP. One may reasonably wonder if, if
and when internal demand slows down, Spain may not face a situation similar
to that of Portugal today.
Perhaps the most interesting comparison however, both for the similarities
and the differences it suggests, is with Germany. In the early 1990s, a boom
due to reunification led to a steady appreciation and a loss of competitiveness.
Since then, low nominal wage growth relative to productivity growth has led
however to a reversal and a slow but steady increase in competitiveness.
Figures 2 and 3 show the relative evolution of nominal wage growth and
productivity in Portugal and Germany. Figure 2 presents graphically informa-
tion presented in tables earlier: Fig. 2a plots the rate of growth of compensation
and the rate of productivity growth for the private sector in Portugal since 1996,
while Fig. 2b presents the deviations of these two rates from their Euro average
counterparts. Figures 3a and 3b do the same for Germany, starting in 1992.
The main message one gets from Fig. 3 is that, each year since 1992, relative
German wage growth has been less than relative German productivity. Thus,
competitiveness—at least measured this way—, has improved each year. In
17Just as in the case of Italy, measured productivity growth is so low as to make one suspect
measurement errors. But so far, culprits have not been clearly identified.
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contrast, as we had seen earlier, Portuguese competitiveness has deteriorated
each year since 1995.
Thus, the experience of Germany shows the way out for Portugal. Low
nominal wage growth and decent productivity growth, if it can be achieved,
lead to higher competitiveness and, eventually, lead back to growth. But it
shows also how slow and painful this way out is. German growth has been
lower than Euro-area growth every year since 1995. Only now does Germany
appear to have recovered, and there are still doubts as to whether and when
higher export growth will lead to sustained higher domestic consumption and
investment growth.
7 Conclusions
I began by arguing that Portugal faced an unusually tough economic challenge:
low growth, low productivity growth, high unemployment, large fiscal and
current account deficits.
I then examined various policy choices, from reforms increasing productiv-
ity growth, to coordinated decreases in nominal wages, and the use of fiscal
policy in this context. I want to end on a more positive note. There is a large
scope for productivity increases in Portugal, and a set of reforms which could
achieve them. A decrease in nominal wages sounds exotic, but is the same in
essence as a successful devaluation. If it can be achieved, it can substantially
reduce the unemployment cost of the adjustment. Fiscal policy can also help.
While deficits must be reduced, temporary fiscal expansion could be part of an
overall package, facilitating the adjustment of wages. The challenge is there.
But so are the tools needed to meet it.
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